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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
REAL PROPERTY-DEEDS-RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS-
COVENANTS IN A DEED RESTRICTING CERTAIN
PROPERTY FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES AND FOR-
BIDDING ITS USE FOR ANY OFFENSIVE BUSINESS
HELD TO INCLUDE A PRIVATE HOSPITAL.-Pierce et
al. v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. et al., 278 S. W. 398 (Mo. 1925).
Plaintiff, a resident and treasurer of Vandeventer Place, a private
residential place in the city of St. Louis, brought this action to prevent
the defendant trust company from leasing a residence in the Place to
the other defendants for use by them as a private hospital for incurable
diseases. Vandeventer Place was platted as a high class residential
addition to the city of St. Lous in 1870 and each lot was restricted
to a single one-family residence. The deed, after specifically naming
certain prohibited uses of the lots, prohibited their use for "any trade
or business of any kind, dangerous, noxious or offensive to the neigh-
boring inhabitants." Since that time the surrounding district has be-
come very largely a business district. Defendants insisted that the pro-
posed use did not come within the restrictions, or, if it did, they had
become a nullity. Held, that the clear intention of the original grantors
had been to create a district reserved for private single family dwell-
ings only, which excluded such a hospital as the one proposed; and that
the restrictions were still valid.
The Court based its reasoning as to the first point on the general
rule in the interpretation of a deed that the intention of the grantor
should be gathered from the whole instrument (Koehler v. Rowland,
275 Mo. 573; Kitchin v. Hawley, 150 Mo. App. 498; Simonds v.
Simonds, 199 Mass. 552, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 686) plus such surround-
ing circumstances as he can be presumed to have considered in drawing
up the instrument (Kitching v. Brown, 180 N. Y. 414). Where it is
necessary to get at the intention when it does not plainly show, parol
evidence may be admitted (Peters v. McLean, 218 Fed. 410), and the
whole instrument is to be read in the light of all the facts and circum-
stances under which it was written (Wise v. Watts, 239 Fed. 207).
Applying this rule, it was the clear intention of the grantors to restrict
this property to a high class residential district, as the deed conveyed
the notion that each lot was limited to a home; that is, the dwelling place
of a single family, according to Sanders v. Dixon, 114 Mo. App. 247.
Moreover, where doubt is cast on the meaning of any words in such
an instrument, it is to be presumed that they were used in their ordi-
nary interpretation (Sanders v. Dixon, supra; Easterbrook v. Hebrew
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIDW
Ladies Orphan Society, 85 Conn. 302). Too, the practical construction
given by the owners of the lots themselves will be taken into account,
as to what is or is not forbidden by the restrictions (James v. Irvine,
141 Mich. 376; Underwood v. Hermann Co. 82 N. J. Eq. 353).
In holding that the use of the premises for such a hospital violated
the restrictions as to "any trade or business of any kind, noxious,
dangerous or offensive," the Court followed Hartwig v. Grace Hos-
pital, 198 Mich. 725; Barnett v. Vaughn Institute, 119 N. Y. S. 45;
and Smith v. Graham, 147 N. Y. S. 773, all similar cases against hos-
pitals or sanitariums. The St. Louis Court of Appeals has even gone
so far as to hold that the use of a room in a doctor's home for con-
sultation with patients was a violation of a similar restriction (Semple
v. Schwarz, 130 Mo. App. 65). However, there is authority to the
contrary, for in Carr v. Riley, 198 Mass. 70, a private hospital whose
appearance had not been altered from a private residence was held not
to be a violation of such a restriction, nor was the use of a basement
as a market for food stuffs in a house otherwise unaltered. The fact
that the outward appearance of the house is not changed seems to
have much weight in these cases. A boarding house (Biggs v. Seagate
Assoc., 211 N. Y. 482) and an Old Ladies Home (Easterbrook v. He-
brew Ladies Orphan Soc., 85 Conn. 289) were also permitted in a
restricted district. The point on which all these cases seem to hinge
is the interpretation of the words "business" and "mercantile establish-
ment." In Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, the words "noxious or
offensive" were held to apply to persons of an ordinarily sensitive
disposition, and not to those who were supersensitive.
As to the second holding that the restrictions were still valid, they
were held to be removed from the rule against perpetuities because the
fee to the public part of the Place was vested in the plaintiff treasurer
and his successors in office, persons now in being (Noel v. Hill, 158
Mo. App. 426; Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573). Grey on Perpetui-
ties, Sec. 280, regards such restrictions as a present vested interest in
the adjoining lot owners. Nor will minor and unimportant violations
of the restrictions by the plaintiffs be considered as a waiver of the
restrictions (Newberry v. Barkalone, 75 N. J. Eq. 128; Bacon v. Sand-
berg, 179 Mass. 396).
-The mere fact that conditions around the restricted neighborhood
have changed so as to surround it with the noise and bustle of a com-
mercial district, destroying the peace and seclusion of a residential
neighborhood will not justify the court in annulling the restrictions
(Spahr v. Cape, 143 Mo. App. 114; Evans v. Foss, 194 Mass. 601;
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Thompson v. Landell, 172 Mo. App. 64) ; even though the property is
more valuable for business purposes than for residences (Reed v. Haz-
ard, 187 Mo. App. 547) ; or the restrictions are harmful to the neigh-
borhood (Noel v. Hill, 158 Mo. App. 426); or even retard the growth
of the city (Landell v. Hamilton, 175 Pa. St. 327). So long as there is
a substantial benefit from them to the adjoining property owners the
restrictions will be enforced (Brown v. Huber, 80 Ohio St. 183),
unless conditions have changed so greatly and obviously that it is
apparent that the enforcement of the restrictions will benefit no one
and is being attempted merely for the purpose of annoying some of the
property owners (Lattimer v. Livermore, 72 N. Y. 114).
W. T., '27.
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